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Abstract
The robustness of deep learning models against adver-
sarial attacks has received increasing attention in recent
years. However, both deep learning and adversarial train-
ing rely on the availability of a large amount of labeled data
and usually do not generalize well to new, unseen classes
when only a few training samples are accessible. To ad-
dress this problem, we explicitly introduce a new challeng-
ing problem – how to learn a robust deep model with limited
training samples per class, called defensive few-shot learn-
ing in this paper. Simply employing the existing adversarial
training techniques in the literature cannot solve this prob-
lem. This is because few-shot learning needs to learn trans-
ferable knowledge from disjoint auxiliary data, and thus it is
invalid to assume the sample-level distribution consistency
between the training and test sets as commonly assumed in
existing adversarial training techniques. In this paper, in-
stead of assuming such a distribution consistency, we pro-
pose to make this assumption at a task-level in the episodic
training paradigm in order to better transfer the defense
knowledge. Furthermore, inside each task, we design a
task-conditioned distribution constraint to narrow the dis-
tribution gap between clean and adversarial examples at a
sample-level. These give rise to a novel mechanism called
multi-level distribution based adversarial training (MDAT)
for learning transferable adversarial defense. In addition, a
unified Fβ score is introduced to evaluate different defense
methods under the same principle. Extensive experiments
demonstrate that MDAT achieves higher effectiveness and
robustness over existing alternatives in the few-shot case.
1. Introduction
Deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [11, 9] have
obtained impressive successes on a variety of computer vi-
sion tasks especially in image classification [5, 4]. Unfor-
tunately, several pieces of recent work [3, 2] have shown
that these CNN models are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples, which are crafted based on original clean inputs
with imperceptible perturbations. Therefore, how to learn
robust models that can effectively defend against various
kinds of attacks becomes a crucial problem. Like an of-
fense and defense game, recent adversarial defense studies
continue to develop new attack techniques [1, 23]. Accord-
ingly, more effective defense mechanisms that are robust
to these attacks have also been developed [13, 14]. This
has considerably improved the robustness of deep learning
models [26, 6, 21].
However, both traditional and adversarially trained deep
models rely on a large amount of labeled data available for
each class. In many real applications, we may only have ac-
cess to a few labeled samples for new, unseen classes (e.g.,
rare species or medical diseases). Learning a classifier when
only a few training samples are available for each class is
well known as few-shot learning in the literature. In the
few-shot setting, deep models become more vulnerable to
adversarial attacks due to the serious lack of training sam-
ples [18]. How to learn an effective and robust model with
limited training data becomes a new challenging problem,
and we call it defensive few-shot learning in this paper.
1.1. Four Questions
In this paper, we concentrate on defensive few-shot im-
age classifications and attempt to answer four key ques-
tions around this new problem: (1) what is the main dif-
ference between generic image classification and defensive
few-shot image classification? (2) how to transfer adver-
sarial defense knowledge from one sample distribution to
another? (3) how to narrow the distribution gap between
clean and adversarial examples in the few-shot setting? (4)
last but not least, how to compare different defense methods
in a convenient and fair manner?
For the first question, a recent important work [18]
proved that adversarially robust generalization requires the
access to more data. However, the few-shot setting has ac-
cess to significantly fewer training samples than generic
image classification. This makes defensive few-shot im-
age classification more difficult to achieve than the robust
generic image classification. In addition, generic image
classification can usually safely assume the sample-level
distribution consistency between the training and test sets.
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However, this assumption cannot be made any more in the
few-shot case. This is because due to the serious lack of
training samples, few-shot learning usually has to resort to
a large-scale but class-disjoint auxiliary set to learn trans-
ferable knowledge. It means that the actual training (i.e.,
auxiliary) set often has a somewhat different sample distri-
bution from the test set of the target few-shot task. Such a
difference naturally leads to the second question, i.e., how
to transfer adversarial defense between two different sample
distributions, which has not been sufficiently considered in
the literature. The distribution discrepancy is also the rea-
son why we cannot directly apply the existing adversarial
defense techniques to address the defensive few-shot learn-
ing problem.
As for the third question, it is well known that there is
usually a large sample distribution gap between clean and
adversarial examples [19]. This distribution gap plays a key
role in making deep models vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples. Note that such a gap does not exist in traditional few-
shot learning which has not considered adversarial attacks.
However, in the new problem of defensive few-shot learning
introduced in this paper, we have to tackle this distribution
gap in order to improve the robustness of classification mod-
els. For the last question, we find that the existing adversar-
ial defense methods often report two kinds of classification
accuracy, i.e., clean example accuracy and adversarial ex-
ample accuracy, to show the effectiveness of their proposed
defense methods. This is understandable because a method
better at defending against adversarial examples could be
worse at classifying clean examples, or vice versa. Never-
theless, this makes a direct comparison of different meth-
ods awkward. Therefore, it is desirable to have a unified
criterion to facilitate the evaluation and comparison of dif-
ferent defensive methods under the same principle, which
has been largely overlooked in the existing literature.
1.2. Our Contributions
Two kinds of distribution gaps (i.e., our challenges) exist
and entangle in defensive few-shot learning, making it dif-
ferent from both generic adversarial training and few-shot
learning. The first is the distribution gap between the train-
ing (auxiliary) set and test set, driving us to think about how
to transfer adversarial defense in this case. The second is
the distribution gap between clean and adversarial exam-
ples, making us to consider how to narrow this gap along
with the first gap.
To address these issues and pursue the answers to the
above four questions, we propose a Multi-level Distribution
based Adversarial Training (MDAT) mechanism for defen-
sive few-shot learning. The main contributions are:
• We analyze and explore how to learn a robust deep
model with very limited training examples per class
for the first time in the literature.
• We propose an episode-based adversarial training
mechanism to transfer adversarial defense across dif-
ferent sample distributions by assuming the distribu-
tion consistency at the task-level.
• We propose a task-conditioned distribution constraint,
which is adaptative to different few-shot tasks, to nar-
row the distribution gap between the clean and adver-
sarial examples inside each task at the sample-level.
• We introduce a unifiedFβ score to conveniently evalu-
ate the overall performance of different defense meth-
ods under the same principle.
• We build upon a state-of-the-art few-shot learning
method and conduct extensive experiments on two
benchmark datasets. This provides rich baseline re-
sults for this new problem, i.e., defensive few-shot
learning, to facilitate future research on this topic.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first briefly present the definition of
the new topic, i.e., defensive few-shot learning. Next, we
introduce some related notations and terminologies used in
this new topic, and review two classic attack methods.
2.1. Defensive Few-shot Learning
A few-shot task normally consists of a support set S and
a query set Q, where S contains C different classes with
K images per class. Given S, the target of few-shot learn-
ing is to infer the correct class label from the C classes for
each unlabeled sample in Q. This setting can be seen as a
C-way K-shot classification setting. Generally, the number
of K is small (e.g., 1 or 5), making it almost impossible to
learn an effective classifier only from the support set S. To
tackle this problem, an additional auxiliary set A is usually
adopted to learn transferable knowledge to help the classi-
fication on Q. Importantly, A contains a larger number of
classes and samples than S , while it has a totally disjoint
class space with S.
Unlike the generic few-shot learning, here, we mainly
focus on how to learn a defensive few-shot classification
model to defend against adversarial attacks, i.e., defensive
few-shot learning. In defensive few-shot learning, we al-
ways assume that the adversary is capable of manipulating
the query images in the query set Q, but doesn’t have ac-
cess to the support set S. Thus, our goal is to learn a robust
model which can correctly classify query images no matter
if they are manipulated.
2.2. Notation
Let Ψ(x) denote a convolutional neural network based
embedding module, which can learn feature representations
for any input image x. We use f(Ψ(x),S) : Rd → RC
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as a classifier module to assign a class label y for a query
image x within C different classes, according to the sup-
port set S. Denote the true class label of x as ytrue. Note
that these two modules can be integrated into a unified net-
work and trained from scratch in an end-to-end manner. The
cost function of f(Ψ(x),S) is denoted as L(x,S, ytrue)
for simplicity. It is easy to use a small perturbation δ to
construct an adversarial image xadv = x+ δ to fool the
classifier, making f(Ψ(xadv),S) 6= ytrue. Generally, the
clean image x and the adversarial image xadv are percep-
tually indistinguishable, which can be bounded by a dis-
tance metric D(x,xadv) ≤ . That is to say,  indicates
the maximum magnitude of the perturbation. Here, we use
`∞ norm to measure the bound of the perturbation, which
means ‖δ‖∞ ≤ . Note that, all clean images are normal-
ized into a range of [0, 1], and all adversarial images are
clipped into the same range. Thus, for a specific perturba-
tion such as  = 0.01, it corresponds to 4 pixels changing
in the range of [0, 255]. In particular, we employ a white-
box attack setting [2] to generate all the training adversarial
images as in [10].
2.3. Attack Methods
Two typical attack methods, i.e., FGSM [3] and
PGD [13], are usually adopted to generate adversarial ex-
amples during the training phase.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3] is a one-
step method, which generates an adversarial example xadv
through a single backward propagation of a neural network
with respect to the input x.
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xL(x,S, ytrue)) , (1)
where ∇xL(x,S, ytrue) indicates the gradient of the loss
function L(x,S, ytrue) with respect to x. FGSM is a com-
monly used adversary because it is simple, computationally
efficient, yet amenable.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [13], a stronger it-
erative variant of FGSM, is equivalent to iterative fast gra-
dient sign method (iFGSM) [10] but with a random starting
point. It mainly applies the FGSM iteratively for k times
with a small step size α.
xadv0 =x+ 0.001 · N (0, I)
xadvk =Clipx,{xadvk−1 + α · sign(∇xL(x,S, ytrue))} ,
(2)
where Clipx,(B) performs element-wise clipping of B,
making each Bi,j clipped into the range [x−,x+]. To
choose a random starting point, we add a random Gaussian
noiseN (0, I) into the input x like [26, 25], whereN (0, I)
denotes a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and identity
variance. Following [10], we set α= 1255 , and the number
of iterations k = min(255 + 4, 255 · 1.25) in the [0,1]
space. PGD has a stronger attack strength than FGSM,
Training Set Test Set Training Set Test Set
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Figure 1. Converting the distribution consistency assumption in the
sample level into the task level. Each geometric shape indicates
one sample and each color denotes one class.
and thus the networks trained with PGD adversaries have
stronger robustness against a wide range of other first-order
attacks [13].
3. MDAT: Multi-level Distribution based Ad-
versarial Training
3.1. Task-level Distribution
In generic image classification, we usually take a distri-
bution consistency assumption between the training and test
sets (i.e., independently and identically distributed data),
guaranteeing the model trained on the training set can gen-
eralize to the test set. However, because of the lack of train-
ing samples in the support set S, few-shot learning usually
resorts to a class-disjoint auxiliary (training) set A to learn
transferable knowledge for S. Since the sample distribution
ofA is relatively different from that of S, the generalization
performance on the target data sets (i.e., S and Q) cannot
be well guaranteed, so does the generalization of adversar-
ial training. As an illustration, from the left side of Fig. 1,
we can observe that there may be a large distribution gap
between training and test sets in the sample space because
these two sets are class-disjoint, making the adversarial de-
fense hardly transferable.
Fortunately, we can assume the above distribution con-
sistency in a task space instead of the sample space (see the
right side of Fig. 1). The task space is composed of a lot of
similar tasks, e.g., few-shot tasks. From the perspective of
task-level distribution, we can construct a large number of
adversarial-based few-shot tasks within the auxiliary set A,
by simulating the target adversarial-based few-shot task. In
doing so, the sample distribution gap can be dealt with by
taking the task distribution consistency assumption.
In fact, this kind of task construction strategy has been
adopted in the episodic training mechanism [22] in tradi-
tional few-shot learning, demonstrating very promising per-
formance. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism
under the adversarial-based few-shot tasks has not been in-
vestigated. In this work, we reinterpret this mechanism
from the perspective of task distribution consistency and de-
velop transferable adversarial defense upon it. To the best
of our knowledge, addressing this task in such a setting is
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the first time in the literature.
Episode-based Adversarial Training. According to the
above task-level distribution consistency assumption, we
propose the following episode-based adversarial training.
Specifically, let {〈S1,Q1〉, . . . , 〈Sn,Qn〉} be a set of few-
shot tasks randomly sampled from the auxiliary set A, the
objective function of our episode-based adversarial training
can be formulated as follows:
Γ = arg min
θ
n∑
i=1
∑
x∈Qi
(
L(x,Si, ytrue)+
max
xadv=x+δ
L(xadv,Si, ytrue)
)
,
(3)
where θ denotes the parameter set of the defensive few-shot
classification model. The core idea here is to simulate the
target adversarial-based few-shot task by conducting a lot
of similar few-shot tasks with the auxiliary training set. In
this way, we can build a task-based space to mitigate the
gap among different sample distributions. At each training
step, we generate adversarial examples inside each of the
sampled tasks according to the current model, and mean-
while, inject these adversarial examples into the training
set. Both clean and adversarial examples will be used to
train this model, enhancing its capability to defend adver-
sarial attacks.
3.2. Sample-level Distribution
Besides the above mentioned sample distribution gap be-
tween the training (auxiliary) and test sets, there is also a
significant sample distribution gap between the clean and
adversarial examples inside each few-shot task. The tra-
ditional few-shot learning cannot deal with such a gap be-
cause it has not considered adversarial attacks. On the other
hand, the generic adversarial training only assigns the same
ground truth to both clean and the corresponding adversar-
ial samples (represented as global feature vectors), while
ignoring the underlying distributions between these two.
To tackle this issue, we propose a task-conditioned and
distribution-based regularizer Lreg inside each few-shot
task 〈Si,Qi〉 used for training. This regularizer effectively
integrates a local-descriptor distribution consistency con-
straint Lfea with a class-prediction consistency constraint
Lclass, which are formulated as follows and explained in
further
Lreg(x,xadv,Si) = Lfea
(
Ψ(x),Ψ(xadv)
)
+
Lclass
(
f(Ψ(x),Si), f(Ψ(xadv),Si)
)
,
(4)
where x ∈ Qi, Ψ(·) denotes the local descriptor based em-
bedding module, and f(·, ·) indicates the classifier module.
Local-descriptor distribution consistency. Lfea is de-
signed to narrow the sample distribution gap between the
clean and adversarial examples in a given task. Note that
this is conducted in the local feature space as inspired by
the recent state-of-the-art few-shot learning method [12].
It represents each image as a set of deep local descriptors
obtained in a 3D convolutional feature map instead of a
pooled global feature vector. Suppose the local descriptors
of clean and adversarial examples follow multivariate nor-
mal distributions, i.e., Ψ(x) ∼ N (µ,Σ) and Ψ(xadv) ∼
N (µadv,Σadv), we design a novel task-conditioned distri-
bution (TCD) measure as follows:
Lfea =(µ− µadv)>Σ−1Si (µ− µadv)+
Tr
(‖Σ− 12Si ΣΣ− 12Si −Σ− 12Si ΣadvΣ− 12Si ‖2F ) , (5)
where Tr(·) is the trace operation and Σ−1Si denotes the in-
verse covariance matrix of the support set Si in the current
few-shot task. Specifically, we use the local descriptors of
all the samples of all the classes in Si to calculate one single
covariance matrixΣSi , which can be seen as a meta-feature
of the current few-shot task. Thus, Eq.(5) is conditioned on
the current few-shot task by transforming both clean and ad-
versarial examples into a common space based on the sup-
port set Si. In particular, the first term of Eq.(5) is a squared
Mahalanobis distance between µ and µadv , depending on
Si. The second term aims to measure the distribution dis-
tance between the clean and adversarial examples with the
second-order information, which is also depended on Si.
The purpose of Σ−
1
2
Si is to transform both clean and adver-
sarial examples of the query set Qi into the same space de-
fined by the current task (see the appendix for more details).
However, the complicated matrix square root (i.e., Σ−
1
2
Si )
makes the calculation of Eq.(5) time-consuming. Fortu-
nately, according to Theorem 1, we can convert Eq.(5) into
an efficient form without matrix square root to accelerate
the calculation.
It is also worth mentioning that it is difficult to use
pooled global features to effectively represent the sample
distribution (say, computing the covariance matrix) of both
clean and adversarial examples, due to the limited exam-
ples under few-shot setting. Instead, as aforementioned, we
employ the rich local descriptors of the convolutional layer
to represent each image and then measure the distribution
consistency between clean and adversarial examples in the
local feature space.
Theorem 1. Suppose Σ1, Σ2 and Σ are all positive semi-
definite matrices, andΣ−
1
2 is the square root of the inverse
of Σ, we have
Tr
(‖Σ− 12Σ1Σ− 12 −Σ− 12Σ2Σ− 12 ‖2F ) =
Tr
[
Σ1Σ
−1 ·Σ1Σ−1
]−
2 Tr
[
Σ1Σ
−1 ·Σ2Σ−1
]
+
Tr
[
Σ2Σ
−1 ·Σ2Σ−1
]
.
(6)
Proof. Let Σˆ1 = Σ−
1
2Σ1Σ
− 12 and Σˆ2 = Σ−
1
2Σ2Σ
− 12 ,
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we have
Tr
(‖Σ− 12Σ1Σ− 12 −Σ− 12Σ2Σ− 12 ‖2F )
= Tr
(‖Σˆ1 − Σˆ2‖2F )
= Tr
[
(Σˆ1 − Σˆ2)>(Σˆ1 − Σˆ2)
]
= Tr
[
Σˆ>1 Σˆ1 − 2Σˆ>1 Σˆ2 + Σˆ>2 Σˆ2
]
= Tr
[
Σˆ>1 Σˆ1
]− 2 Tr [Σˆ>1 Σˆ2]+ Tr [Σˆ>2 Σˆ2] .
(7)
Specifically, according to the basic properties of matrix, for
Tr
[
Σˆ>1 Σˆ1
]
, we can obtain
Tr
[
Σˆ>1 Σˆ1
]
= Tr
[
(Σ−
1
2Σ1Σ
− 1
2 )>(Σ−
1
2Σ1Σ
− 1
2 )
]
(both Σ1 and Σ−
1
2 are symmetric)
= Tr
[
Σ−
1
2Σ1Σ
− 1
2Σ−
1
2Σ1Σ
− 1
2
]
(because Σ−1 = Σ−
1
2 Σ−
1
2 )
= Tr
[
Σ−
1
2Σ1Σ
−1Σ1Σ
− 1
2
]
(because Tr(ABC) = Tr(CBA))
= Tr
[
Σ1Σ
−1 ·Σ1Σ− 12Σ− 12
]
= Tr
[
Σ1Σ
−1 ·Σ1Σ−1
]
.
(8)
Similarly, we can easily obtain
Tr
[
Σˆ>1 Σˆ2
]
= Tr
[
Σ1Σ
−1 ·Σ2Σ−1
]
Tr
[
Σˆ>2 Σˆ2
]
= Tr
[
Σ2Σ
−1 ·Σ2Σ−1
]
.
(9)
Bring Eq.(8) and Eq.(9) back to Eq.(7), we can obtain
Eq.(6). Hence proved.
Class-prediction consistency. As for Lclass, the goal is
to make the class predictions of both clean and adversarial
examples similar. In other words, the probability distribu-
tions of the predicted classes of clean and adversarial exam-
ples should be similar. For this end, we employ a simple `2
norm to conduct this loss, that is,
Lclass = ‖f(Ψ(x),Si)− f(Ψ(xadv),Si)‖22 . (10)
Thus, the overall optimization formulation of the pro-
posed MDAT framework is
Γ = arg min
θ
n∑
i=1
∑
x∈Qi
(
L(x,Si, ytrue)+
max
xadv=x+δ
L(xadv,Si, ytrue)+λ·Lreg(x,xadv,Si)
)
,
(11)
where λ is a balancing parameter and L(·) denotes the
cross-entropy loss.
3.3. A Unified Evaluation Criterion
Training a model with adversarial examples can indeed
improve the robustness of this model. At the same time, it
could jeopardise the performance of this model on the orig-
inal clean examples. There may exist a trade-off between
robustness (against adversarial examples) and accuracy (on
clean examples). Several recent works have been trying to
show this issue [21, 25]. In the literature, adversarial train-
ing based work generally reports two kinds of classification
accuracy, i.e., accuracy on the clean examples and accu-
racy on the adversarial examples. However, in real cases,
it could be awkward to compare two defense methods over-
all with two accuracies. To this end, inspired by the case of
Recall and Precision in information retrieval, we introduce
Fβ score as a unified criterion to evaluate different defense
methods under the same principle. To be specific, Fβ is for-
mulated with both clean accuracyACCclean and adversarial
accuracy ACCadv as
Fβ = (1 + β2) · ACCclean · ACCadv
β2 · ACCclean +ACCadv . (12)
For instance, if we would like to maintain a high accuracy
on the original clean examples, and meanwhile, improve
the robustness as higher as possible, we can use F0.5. In
contrast, if we mainly concern the robustness, F2 will be
an alternative option. In addition, we can also generate the
curve of Fβ by varying β as a more comprehensive way to
compare different methods (see the appendix).
4. Experiments
In this section, we perform few-shot image classifica-
tion on two benchmark datasets by applying our proposed
MDAT mechanism to learn defensive few-shot classifiers.
The main targets include: (1) is the task-level distribu-
tion consistency assumption effective? (2) can the task-
conditioned regularization improve the robustness and ac-
curacy?
Datasets. Two datasets are picked as the benchmarks,
i.e., miniImageNet [22] and CIFAR-100 [8]. miniImageNet
consists of 100 classes, and there are 600 images in each
class with a resolution of 84×84. We follow [17] and take
64, 16 and 20 classes for training (auxiliary), validation and
test, respectively. As for CIFAR-100, we follow [20] and
take 60, 20 and 20 classes for training (auxiliary), validation
and test.
Network Architecture. A commonly used four-layer
convolutional neural network [24, 12] in few-shot learning
is adopted as the embedding module. It consists of four con-
volutional blocks, each of which contains a convolutional
layer, a batch normalization layer and a LeakyReLU layer.
Note that other networks (e.g., ResNet [5]) can be used as
alternative, which is not the main concern of this paper.
Attack Setting. We apply FGSM [3] and PGD [13] at-
tackers to find adversarial examples for training two kinds
of robust models, i.e., FGSM-based and PGD-based, re-
spectively. During training, we follow [10] and randomly
choose a perturbation  for each training few-shot task from
a normal distribution in the range of [0, 0.01]. Moreover,
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Table 1. Comparison (%) of DN4 and DN4-AT with or without episodic training on miniImageNet. A FGSM attacker is adopted.
Method Episode Clean =0.003 =0.007 =0.01ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5
DN4 without 53.64 22.03 41.67 18.30 38.69 16.43 36.91
DN4-AT without 52.59 44.59 50.76 35.15 47.84 31.93 46.56
DN4 with 70.84 17.25 43.69 7.23 25.67 5.57 21.18
DN4-AT with 67.30 55.23 64.48 41.91 60.02 32.89 55.65
for each input clean image (i.e., query image), we con-
struct its corresponding adversarial counterpart. The hype-
parameter λ in Eq.(11) is empirically set as 0.5 for all the
experiments. During test, we evaluate the robustness of the
trained models in defense of three levels of attacks, i.e.,
 = {0.003, 0.007, 0.01}.
Experimental Setting. For fairness and simplicity, all
experiments are conducted around a 5-way 5-shot task on
the benchmark datasets based on one state-of-the-art few-
shot learning method, i.e., DN4 [12]. The reason why we
choose DN4 is that it is one of the latest methods and uses
local descriptors. Meanwhile, we highlight that in princi-
ple, our proposed MDAT mechanism is general and can be
applied into any other few-shot learning method.
In the training stage, we employ the episode-based ad-
versarial training to train all the models, following the as-
sumption of task-level distribution consistency. Specifi-
cally, we train all the models for 40 epochs, and in each
epoch, we randomly sample and construct 10, 000 few-shot
tasks (i.e., episodes). In each conducted few-shot task, there
are 5 support classes with 5 support images and 10 query
images per class. Adam algorithm [7] is used to update all
the models. The initial learning rate is set as 0.005 and
cut in half per 10 epochs. Importantly, all the models are
trained from scratch in an end-to-end manner. In the test
stage, 3000 few-shot tasks are constructed from the test set
for evaluation. The top-1 mean accuracy and the introduced
Fβ score are taken as the evaluation criteria. In particu-
lar, we set β = 0.5 in our experiments, which means that
the clean accuracy (the weight is 4/5) is regarded as more
important than the adversarial accuracy (the weight is 1/5).
This considers the fact that clean samples are more common
in practice.
4.1. Adversarial Defense Transfer
Our main concern is how to transfer the adversarial de-
fense from a sample distribution to another different one.
We have a hypothesis that the task-level distribution con-
sistency assumption is able to improve the generalization
performance of defense ability of our model. To verify
this hypothesis, we conduct a comparison experiment on
miniImageNet.
We first use the standard adversarial training on the aux-
iliary set A (64 classes), and then transfer the adversari-
ally trained model on the test set (20 classes). Specifically,
we use the standard adversarial training [3] to train a 64-
classes classification network on A, and directly perform
DN4 without additional training (because the classification
module of DN4 is non-parametric) on the test set based on
this pre-trained network. As for the comparison method,
we train DN4 on the auxiliary set A with the proposed
episode-based adversarial training (i.e., Eq.(3)), and eval-
uate it on the test set. Furthermore, two non-adversarially
trained DN4s are additionally taken as baselines.
All the results are reported in Table 1. As seen, without
adversarial training, DN4 is much vulnerable to adversar-
ial attacks, dropping its accuracy from 53.64% (clean accu-
racy) to 16.43% (adversarial accuracy) when  = 0.01. In
contrast, the adversarially trained DN4-AT can indeed de-
fend the adversarial attacks as expected (from 16.43% to
31.93%). However, both clean and adversarial accuracies
of DN4-AT are still far from the normal accuracy on the
miniImageNet dataset (70.84%).
Fortunately, the episodic training makes DN4-AT per-
form much better than the non-episode based DN4-AT on
both clean and adversarial examples. For instance, when
= 0.003, the episode-based DN4-AT obtains 10.64% and
13.72% improvements over the non-episode based one on
the adversarial accuracy and F0.5 score, respectively. More
importantly, the clean accuracy is improved from 52.59%
to 67.30%, which is much close to the normal clean ac-
curacy (70.84%). Therefore, it means that the episode-
based adversarial training can not only transfer the adver-
sarial defense knowledge but also preserve the clean clas-
sification knowledge. This verifies that the traditional sam-
ple distribution consistency assumption may not guarantee
the model’s generalization on both clean and adversarial ex-
amples, while the task distribution consistency assumption
during episodic training can properly make it. This achieves
the first target in Section 4.
4.2. Adversarial Defense on miniImageNet
We have verified that the episode-based adversarial train-
ing can facilitate the adversarial defense transfer and im-
prove the generalization ability of few-shot models. How-
ever, the performance gap between the clean and adversarial
accuracies is still large (see Tabel 1). It is necessary to in-
troduce defense techniques to narrow this performance gap.
To further verify the effectiveness of our proposed tech-
nique on this challenge, we consider episode-based ad-
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Table 2. Comparison (%) of different defense methods on miniImageNet. Both training and test are based on a FGSM attacker.
Method Episode Clean =0.003 =0.007 =0.01ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5
NT with 70.84 17.25 43.69 7.23 25.67 5.57 21.18
AT [3] with 67.30 55.23 64.48 41.91 60.02 32.89 55.65
ATDA [19] with 67.15 54.18 64.08 39.76 59.01 31.14 54.53
ATDA-`2 with 67.46 55.11 64.56 40.50 59.53 32.94 55.77
ALP [6] with 66.31 56.51 64.08 44.12 60.24 36.96 57.22
MDAT (ours) with 67.27 56.97 64.92 44.82 61.14 37.34 57.97
Table 3. Comparison (%) of different defense methods on miniImageNet. Both training and test are based on a PGD attacker.
Method Episode Clean =0.003 =0.007 =0.01ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5
NT with 70.88 19.33 46.22 2.33 10.29 0.80 3.82
AT [3] with 66.69 53.99 63.69 38.00 57.94 27.51 51.90
ATDA [19] with 67.28 54.20 64.18 36.56 57.60 25.42 50.61
ATDA-`2 with 68.39 54.98 65.00 37.69 58.80 27.09 52.40
ALP [6] with 66.27 56.00 63.92 41.65 59.26 32.24 54.71
MDAT (ours) with 67.67 56.49 65.09 41.72 60.18 32.44 55.59
versarial training as the default setting and compare our
proposed MDAT with other adversarial defense methods.
Specifically, three state-of-the-art methods are employed,
including the standard adversarial training (AT) [3], Ad-
versarial Logit Pairing (ALP) [6], and Adversarial Training
with Domain Adaptation (ATDA) [19]. We reimplement all
these methods based on DN4 for a fair comparison. Also,
they are all trained and tested using a FGSM attacker. Note
that ATDA [19] proposes two losses, i.e., a unsupervised
domain adaptation loss (UDA) and a supervised domain
adaptation loss (SDA). SDA cannot be used in the few-shot
case (classes are varied) because it needs to maintain a log-
its center for each fixed class, we reimplement ATDA only
with the UDA loss. Instead of the original global features,
local descriptors are adopted in ATDA for more promising
performances. Additionally, we compare with one variant
of ATDA (named ATDA-`2), where UDA is based on `2
norm but not original `1 norm. To make it more intuitive,
the normal trained (NT) DN4 is added as a baseline, which
is only trained on the clean examples.
The results are provided in Table 2. Compared with these
methods, our proposed MDAT can not only maintain the
accuracy on the clean examples, but also improve the ro-
bustness on the adversarial examples. Notably, the pro-
posed MDAT obtains both the highest adversarial accura-
cies and F0.5 scores on all three levels of adversarial at-
tacks. It can also be seen that ATDA using `1 based UDA
loss cannot improve and even jeopardize the model robust-
ness over the standard adversarial training (i.e., AT). On the
contrary, our implemented ATDA-`2 performs better than
ATDA on the robustness and can even improve the clean ac-
curacy. This means that it is reasonable to employ `2 norm
based distribution constraints (i.e., Eq.(5) and Eq.(10)) to
improve the generalization performance. ALP gains a large
improvement over AT on the robustness especially against
a stronger attacker. For instance, it obtains 4.07% improve-
ments over AT when  = 0.01. However, ALP loses almost
1% accuracy on the original clean examples.
Besides the FGSM attack, we also adopt a stronger at-
tacker PGD to train and test all these methods (see Ta-
ble 3). As seen, the proposed MDAT is still superior to
all the other methods (see F0.5 score). It is also worth not-
ing that it is truly difficult to obtain great improvements on
both clean and adversarial accuracies simultaneously, i.e., a
good trade-off claimed in [21, 25]. In this sense, the im-
provements of the proposed MDAT over other comparison
methods have their significance. Thus, the second target in
Section 4 is achieved.
4.3. Adversarial Defense on CIFAR-100
To show the consistent effectiveness of the proposed
MDAT, we conduct few-shot classification tasks on a more
challenging dataset, i.e., CIFAR-100 with lower image reso-
lution and more challenging class splits. All the settings are
similar to the ones on miniImageNet, and we also employ
a FGSM (PGD) attacker to train and test all the methods,
respectively. The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. It
can be seen that our proposed MDAT obtains consistently
superior results than other competitors on both clean and
adversarial accuracies, especially on the F0.5 score. For ex-
ample, in Table 4, when  = 0.01, MDAT obtains 29.69%,
2.87%, 4.65% and 0.8% improvements over NT, AT, ATDA
and ALP in terms of the F0.5 score, respectively.
4.4. Ablation Study
An ablation study is conducted to verify the effective-
ness of each part of the proposed MDAT mechanism in
Table 6. First, the episode-based adversarial training is
adopted as the default setting. We degrade MDAT to the
simplest variant AT by removing the proposed Lreg regu-
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Table 4. Comparison (%) of different defense methods on CIFAR-100. Both training and test are based on a FGSM attacker.
Method Episode Clean =0.003 =0.007 =0.01ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5
NT with 54.37 10.14 29.03 4.48 16.84 3.68 14.47
AT [3] with 54.78 40.90 51.29 27.59 45.76 20.81 41.29
ATDA [19] with 53.53 38.55 49.66 25.15 43.67 19.30 39.51
ALP [6] with 54.09 42.74 51.36 30.56 46.87 24.19 43.36
MDAT (ours) with 55.12 42.45 52.01 30.92 47.65 24.60 44.16
Table 5. Comparison (%) of different defense methods on CIFAR-100. Both training and test are based on a PGD attacker.
Method Episode Clean =0.003 =0.007 =0.01ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5
NT with 54.64 11.87 31.75 1.90 8.34 0.62 2.96
AT [3] with 54.76 43.02 51.92 27.20 45.53 20.11 40.72
ATDA [19] with 53.92 40.88 50.68 24.41 43.42 17.61 38.17
ALP [6] with 54.71 43.27 51.96 29.26 46.60 22.61 41.10
MDAT (ours) with 54.87 44.02 52.29 29.95 47.04 22.56 41.13
Table 6. Ablation study of our MDAT on miniImageNet based on a FGSM attacker.
Episode AT Lclass Lfea Clean =0.003 =0.007 =0.01ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5 ACC F0.5
X X 67.30 55.23 64.48 41.91 60.02 32.89 55.65
X X X 66.31 56.51 64.08 44.12 60.24 36.96 57.22
X X X 68.22 55.74 65.29 41.61 60.48 32.91 56.16
X X X X 67.27 56.97 64.92 44.82 61.14 37.34 57.97
larization. From Table 6, we can observe that Lclass can
dramatically improve the adversarial accuracies while only
lose approximately 1% clean accuracy. Unlike Lclass, the
designed Lfea can perform excellently on the clean images
(i.e., 68.22%) and also slightly improve the adversarial ac-
curacies in most cases (e.g., =0.003 and =0.01). There-
fore, to maintain both the clean and adversarial accuracies,
combining AT with Lfea and Lclass will be a better option.
5. Discussions on Related Work
There is a large body of adversarial training based related
work [26, 15, 25], focusing on the robustness of generic
image classification. However, the robustness and defense
transferability in the few-shot case have been less consid-
ered by the state-of-the-art approaches. Here, we only dis-
cuss the most relevant studies. To improve the robustness of
semi-supervised classification, Miyato et al. [14] propose a
semi-supervised virtual adversarial training method (VAT)
by calculating the KL divergence between the predictions
on the clean examples and the adversarial examples. Simi-
larly, Kannan et al. [6] present a symmetric adversarial logit
pairing strategy (ALP), encouraging similar embeddings of
the clean and the corresponding adversarial examples. Re-
cently, Song et al. [19] introduce domain adaptation into ad-
versarial training (ATDA) to learn domain invariant repre-
sentations for both clean and adversarial domains. The main
differences between our MDAT and these methods are: (1)
the above methods simply consider the generic image clas-
sification setting, which is actually related to the sample-
level distribution constraint (i.e., Lreg) in our MDAT; (2)
the regularization terms used in these methods are fixed
and cannot adapt to different tasks, while our regularization
term (i.e., Eq.(5)) facilitates addressing the task shift since
it is explicitly conditioned on the task; (3) instead of only
focusing on the global embeddings and class-prediction dis-
tributions as in these three related methods, we additionally
consider the local-descriptor distribution consistency in a
local feature space. This can be more effective for captur-
ing the distributions of both clean and adversarial examples
in the few-shot case.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a new challenging problem
for the first time, i.e., defensive few-shot learning, aiming to
learn robust classification models with limited training sam-
ples in each class. The key to this problem is how to transfer
the common representations and adversarial defense knowl-
edge. To that end, we propose a Multi-level Distribution
based Adversarial Training (MDAT) mechanism. Extensive
experiments have verified that (1) the task-level distribu-
tion consistency assumption can guarantee the generaliza-
tion performance of our MDAT; (2) narrowing the sample-
level distribution gap with the proposed task-conditioned
distribution constraint can further improve the robustness
and accuracy.
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A. Further Interpretation of Local-descriptor
Distribution Consistency
The essence of Lfea is to transform both clean and ad-
versarial examples into a common feature space that is built
by the support set Si in the current few-shot task 〈Si,Qi〉.
In the common feature space, we use the proposed distribu-
tion measure Lfea to narrow the distribution gap between
the clean and adversarial examples. In this way, the cur-
rent few-task information is conditioned on the distribution
measure, which can further tackle the task shift issue ac-
companied by the task distribution consistency assumption.
Degrade the formulation of Lfea by removing Σ−1Si and
Σ
− 12
Si as below,
Lfea = (µ−µadv)>(µ−µadv) + Tr
(
‖Σ−Σadv‖2F
)
, (13)
which can be seen as an approximate 2-Wasserstein dis-
tance [16] between the clean example distribution and ad-
versarial example distribution.
SinceΣSi is the covariance matrix of the support set Si,
it is a positive definite matrix. Thus,ΣSi can be mathemati-
cally decomposed asΣ−
1
2
Si Σ
− 12
Si , whereΣ
− 12
Si can be seen as
a transformation matrix. For each clean image x, it can be
transformed asΣ−
1
2
Si x. Therefore, in the new feature space,
the covariance matrix of the transformed clean examples is
Σ
− 12
Si ΣΣ
− 12
Si . Similarly, we can obtain Σ
− 12
Si Σ
advΣ
− 12
Si for
the transformed adversarial examples. Then we can convert
Eq.(13) into
Lfea =(Σ−
1
2
Si µ−Σ
− 1
2
Si µ
adv)>(Σ
− 1
2
Si µ−Σ
− 1
2
Si µ
adv)+
Tr
(‖Σ− 12Si ΣΣ− 12Si −Σ− 12Si ΣadvΣ− 12Si ‖2F )
=(µ− µadv)>Σ−
1
2
Si Σ
− 1
2
Si (µ− µ
adv)+
Tr
(‖Σ− 12Si ΣΣ− 12Si −Σ− 12Si ΣadvΣ− 12Si ‖2F )
=(µ− µadv)>Σ−1Si (µ− µadv)+
Tr
(‖Σ− 12Si ΣΣ− 12Si −Σ− 12Si ΣadvΣ− 12Si ‖2F ) .
(14)
B. Qualitative comparison: Curve of Fβ Score
In the main paper, we prefer to use F0.5 score to obtain
quantitative results for different comparison methods. In
fact, we can also generate the curve of Fβ by varying the
value of β for qualitative comparison.
For example, we plot the curve of Fβ by varying β from
0 to 2 according to the results in Table 2 ( = 0.003) in the
main paper. We can see that our MDAT performs consis-
tently superior to other methods for any value of β (see the
above Figure 2).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
The value of 
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
F
The curve of F  varying , when =0.003.
MDAT (Ours) 
ALP 
AT 
ATDA 
=0.003
Figure 2. The curves of Fβ of different methods by varying the
value of β from 0 to 2.
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